Introduction
Decentralization in the developing world has involved the political selection of the design of local jurisdictions by central and regional governments. In many countries, especially in the African and South Asian regions, and in poor provinces in Latin America, the governments' choice of decentralization instruments results in the creation of very local village-level governments, with low capacity, almost no access to own tax bases, and spending and decision-making powers restricted to the administering of higher-tier grants for local infrastructure and beneficiary selection of welfare schemes. In contrast, decentralization to municipalities or cities with revenue-raising potential has been stalled, with revenue powers being retained by central or regional governments. This paper addresses the question of why countries choose to decentralize partially. In one view, even grants-based decentralization to rural local governments is a significant institutional reform to address political agency problems in developing countries, particularly of government responsiveness to poor citizens (World Bank, various; Bardhan, 2002) .
2 This paper examines grants-financed decentralization from an alternate perspective, as a strategic political choice which enables the targeting of benefits to select constituents, at the expense of broad public goods. In this model, decentralization is subject to political capture, with local spending targeted to votebuying, patronage, or pork barrel projects. The tension in the model is between clientelist politics (targeted transfers to buy votes) versus the broad public interest-clientelist 1 In India, for example, decentralization has largely taken the form of charging locally elected village governments, the Gram Panchayats, with beneficiary selection of poverty alleviation schemes; while municipal governments with access to tax bases and user charges are denied the power to set these, and local revenue-raising power is retained by state governments (Mohanty et al, 2007; Sahsranaman, 2009) . 2 Governments in developing countries pursuing decentralization reforms also describe these as designed to promote greater participation of poor citizens in public decision-making, and to strengthen citizen ability to exact accountability from their public agents. For example, these views were provided in publicly available conference papers by the initiator of Bolivia's Ley de Participacion Popular (Sanchez de Lozada, 2000) , and the implementer of India's Panchayati Raj Act (Aiyer, 2009). transfers may indeed be targeted to the poor, but only to some of them or only in small amounts, at the expense of broad public goods for larger numbers.
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The paper therefore explores a political economy explanation for cases where decentralization remains partial long since the initiation of reforms. It argues that partial decentralization is selected and maintained by politicians in the face of increasing participation by swing voters, because it enables them to win elections by dividing the strength of swing voters, and continue to provide targeted benefits to core supporters.
Decentralization in this theory helps prolong clientelistic political competition at the expense of broad public goods platforms, even when elections become more broad-based and contested.
This risk of "political capture" of decentralization is to be distinguished from that of elite capture analyzed by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000 , 2006a . Under political capture, even when local spending is better targeted to poor citizens than centrally or provincially allocated spending, such local targeting enables central or regional political parties to buy votes and win elections even as they reduce general government allocations to broad public goods. Much of the evaluation of impact of moving from centralized to decentralized resource allocation has focused on whether the benefit incidence of decentralized spending is more likely to be on poorer households (Araujo et al, 2008; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Mansuri and Rao, 2004) . This paper does not compare allocations by central and local agents, instead examining the political choice to decentralize and its implications for consolidated government tax and spending decisions.
The theoretical framework is derived from the literature on political determinants of fiscal policy, where political parties consist of organized interest groups that derive benefits from holding office and from club goods targeted to their group (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Persson et al, 2007) . Within this political economy framework, it is difficult to find technical (non-political) conditions under which any governing party would choose to decentralize, even when a benevolent 3 Indeed, theoretical and empirical studies of "vote-buying" have concluded that such transfers are targeted to the poor (Harding, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Brusco et al, 2004) .
planner would for reasons of heterogeneity of preferences across local settlements. This is because any governing party would have to give up revenue-raising authority to jurisdictions where rival parties could come to power and thereby exercise control over the allocation of those revenues.
Again, within this political economy framework, even if a benevolent planner manages to gain leadership and initiate decentralization reforms, the implementation of those reforms would be subsequently subject to political capture. Political incentives for decentralization can be created in this framework under assumptions of political advantages from mobilization of votes through local elections. Political selection of decentralization, or political capture of benevolent decentralization in this model would be characterized primarily by overwhelming or exclusive dependence on grants for local government spending and little or no devolution of revenue raising authority. Local government spending decisions would be characterized by welfare transfers to poor swing voters in exchange for their vote. Inter-jurisdiction grants distribution would be influenced by political affiliations of local incumbents.
Changes in political participation in elections would have implications for the size and distribution of local government grants. When higher tier political incumbents face more demanding "swing" voters, decentralized delivery of welfare programs may be used for more effective targeting of the "cheapest" swing votes, at lower levels of progressive taxes and public goods than in the absence of decentralized vote-buying. That is, this framework can create another type of "swing voter's curse", in which greater demands by them for public goods are thwarted through greater decentralized vote buying.
Decentralization policies are therefore determined in this model by politicians to facilitate vote mobilization for their political party to win office, akin to gerrymandering districts in electoral politics.
The fiscal characteristics of decentralization implied by this political economy framework are in fact increasingly common in many developing countries. Large amounts of public resources for anti-poverty programs are being provided as grants to rural local governments who have the authority to select beneficiaries of local projects (Ravallion, 1999; Alderman, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005, 2006b) . In several decentralized countries in Africa, South and East Asia, more than 90 percent of local government expenditures are financed by grants from higher tiers (Choudhuri, 2006; World Bank, various) . 4 Additionally, studies in a range of countries as diverse as Albania, Brazil, India, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Sweden, and the United States, find evidence that higher tiers of governments strategically distribute grants across local jurisdictions to favor their political supporters (reviews in Boex and MartinezVazquez, 2005; and Khemani, 2006) .
There is some available evidence, mostly anecdotal, from a range of countries, including Brazil, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Philippines, on the salience of votebuying, patronage, and violence in local elections (Bardhan et al, 2008; Cheema and Mohmand, 2008) . In the political capture model presented here, and in this anecdotal evidence, the capture of public resources for private benefits need not be restricted to the elite; even poor and traditionally disadvantaged voters may demand private goods from local politicians (such as jobs, subsidies, cash and in-kind transfers) instead of broad public goods (such as quality health and education).
Indeed, the critical assumption required to derive the result of political capture of decentralization for greater clientelism at the expense of broad public goods, is that the pivotal swing voters in local jurisdictions provide strictly greater vote returns when allocated private transfers instead of broad public goods. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) use completely opposite assumptions, of the increasing value of the public good to pivotal voters, to explain the extension of suffrage by English elites in the mid-late 1800s. They argue and provide some evidence that in England, the increase in the value of urban public goods following the industrial revolution (public health infrastructure such as sewerage, waterworks and paved roads), led to a majority of the franchised elite pushing for reforms to extend the suffrage so that political parties would have stronger incentives to deliver these public goods. They show that following suffrage reforms, spending by municipal corporations on public health infrastructure increased substantially, while spending on welfare transfers to the poor was reduced. That is, a diametrically different conclusion than that provided here of local spending on targeted transfers. It has implications for innovation in current institutional interventions to improve accountability for public goods in developing countries by influencing the demands of pivotal voters.
In modeling decentralization as an endogenous political decision, this paper differs from traditional theories of the benefits of decentralization predicated upon the natural existence of local jurisdictions with intra-community common preferences and inter-community heterogeneity (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972 Cremer and Palfrey (1996) , Lockwood (2004) , and Redoano and Scharf (2004) examine the role of decision-making rules, national referenda versus legislative voting, majority and unanimity rules, in the selection of the degree of centralization, with preferences for decentralization distributed regionally.
There is other work exploring decentralization to local governments as a political strategy, focusing on incentives of national politicians to bypass regional governments that pose a political threat. Dickovick (2007) within countries, but most of these relate to the creation of larger province-type jurisdictions, with significant local autonomy, and not to the creation of fiscal authority at the level of villages or towns, the tier for which implications are drawn in this paper (Panizza, 1999) .
The theory offered in this paper of the political selection of jurisdiction boundaries has policy implications for international development assistance. Technical assistance and lending programs typically focus on addressing vertical and horizontal fiscal "imbalances", spring-boarding from the observation that new local governments are not devolved "sufficient" grants to fulfill the expenditure responsibilities assigned to them. This paper suggests that when jurisdiction boundaries are deliberately chosen to keep them grants-dependent for political targeting, focusing policy largely on increasing grants to existing jurisdictions for greater local spending can exacerbate patronage politics. It can fuel people's evaluation of local governments on the basis of funding and projects that can be garnered from above, at the expense of inter and intra-jurisdiction competition on the basis of competency to deliver broad public goods with scarce resources. Instead, the political analysis suggests strengthening other strategies that focus on identifying institutional and governance interventions to undercut patronage incentives and enable voters to mobilize to demand broad public services.
The next section provides a new theoretical framework for the choice of decentralization of public spending to local jurisdictions, financed by grants, to serve electoral objectives. Section 3 discusses some evidence on decentralization experiences in select countries and regions that are consistent with the theory. Section 4 discusses the implications of the theory for international development assistance and explores the potential of local governance interventions to overcome local patronage politics. Section 5 concludes.
The theoretical framework
The theoretical framework here to analyze political selection of decentralization is drawn from a large literature on the political economy of fiscal policy choices (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Persson et al, 2007) . A basic premise in these models is that voters organize themselves into interest groups, represented by political parties, to influence public policy for their group's benefit. Khemani and Wane (2009) the literature of what it means to be "swing". First, swing voters in this model are indifferent between voting for or against an incumbent government, based upon comparing the benefits of economic policy against a reservation utility (as in Persson et al; . Second, swing voters in this model are not ideologically attached to political parties, and vote only the basis of evaluating general public policies of incumbent governments (as in Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995, 1996 ; and much of the political science literature). Third, some models define swing voters as those whose ballot ultimately determine the outcome of elections (as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996) , which also happens in the equilibrium in this model. Raising taxes is costly for the government. It may need to allocate resources for enforcing the payment of taxes and prevent tax evasion for instance. We assume that when the government imposes an amount τ in taxes it only collects θ(τ)*τ i.e. the cost associated with this level of taxation is (1-θ(τ))*τ. The inefficiency of the tax system is captured by ) (  which has the following usual properties for an inverted-U Laffer curve for tax revenues:
The tax rate at which revenues are maximized is given by max    . Correspondingly, the maximum amount of public good that can be provided in this economy is given by
The general public good g , the rents to political party members, 
is the government's tax revenue when the tax rate is .

The politics. The two political parties 1 P , and 2 P compete during elections to win a majority of votes, and choose the policy vector
. Any member of the political parties,
can be a candidate. The political party that wins office chooses policies to maximize the welfare of its members (core constituents) subject to a re-election constraint (to be derived below), in addition to the budget constraint specified in equation (2) above. The objective function of party j in government is given by: 
is the difference in size of the core constituents of the two political parties.  is the minimum swing votes the incumbent government needs to win re-election.
The political distortion. In the absence of political considerations, a utilitarian social planner would solve only the public goods and taxation problem, setting all targeted transfers to zero. The public good optimization problem is therefore:
We assume that 0   i.e. the swing voters expect to be at least as well off as under laissez-faire with no taxation and no public goods or spending targeted to them. subject to
The solution is familiar, given by:
The level of public goods supplied in the utilitarian optimum equates marginal social benefit of the public good to its marginal social cost of production. The utilitarian government raises just enough taxes to finance the production of the public good, spending nothing on targeted transfers to organized interest groups or individual swing voters.
7
When political considerations are taken into account, the incumbent political party will deviate from this optimum and aim to provide targeted transfers to its core constituents, and perhaps also to some swing voters to win elections. The extent to which it is able to capture public benefits for its core supporters depends upon its prospects for gaining public office which in turn depends upon how demanding swing voters are, or the function F(ω) chosen by nature. 8 We now derive the preferred levels of the tax, the public good, and targeted rents of an incumbent political party, denoted by
G r * respectively, or the policy package incumbents would implement if their re-election constraint were ignored or not binding. A government's optimization of the welfare of its core constituents consists of a two-step procedure. First, it chooses the tax rate that maximizes the disposable income of its constituents to whom all tax proceeds are redistributed:
7 If the objective of the social planner is redistribution, to equalize welfare or to guarantee a minimum level of welfare for the poorest group, then private transfers to the poorest may emerge in equilibrium depending on the gains to welfare from public goods versus private transfers. 8 In our model, if voters could cooperate and choose the distribution of reservation utilities (as in Persson et al. , 2000) they will set it in a way to extract the maximum amount of public good from whatever government is in place. This assumption is, however, unrealistic since it requires a high level of information. It is also inconsistent with our modeling of swing voters as unorganized, and therefore unable to coordinate. We instead consider atomistic voters who cannot communicate or cooperate. Each swing voter will then independently set her reservation utility or will be assigned one by nature. 9 The simultaneous use of inefficient transfers to and taxes on the same group was a puzzling feature of African fiscal policies highlighted in Bates' (1981) classic study of political economy. In our model, transfers are redistributive, to lower the net tax burden on the incumbent political group. Taxes across groups are uniform, the underlying rationale being to avoid additional distortions to revenue generation from economic decision-making by the rival groups.
The first order condition for the above maximization, where
Second, the government chooses that optimal level of the public good that would be financed by its constituents alone, equating the marginal benefit and costs of the public good accruing only to its constituents, or
. Note that this level of public good is lower than the utilitarian social planner's optimum.
Finally, it redistributes the total tax revenue, net of public good spending, amongst its constituents, giving no specific transfers to the members of the opposition party or to swing voters. The government's constituents thus receive
as specific transfer, which gives them a consumption level of , and have a final consumption of
The incumbent government can choose its preferred policy package when its preferred level of public good is sufficient to win the minimum swing votes needed for
It would also choose this when re-election is entirely out of reach, which happens when swing voters are too demanding and the minimum swing votes required for victory cannot be obtained even by spending all revenues on them at the maximum tax rate max  That is, governments anticipate defeat in an upcoming election, and implement predatory policy (their most preferred policy). Incumbent government's constrained choice under re-election. Suppose that the distribution of reservation utilities is such that
. The government can then either increase the level of the public good or provide targeted transfers to swing voters until it receives the minimum swing votes  . The decision to reallocate resources away from the preferred allocation, in which the core constituents of 10 We assume throughout the paper that
This assumption means that the preferred tax rate of the government generates at least enough revenue to pay for its preferred level of public good. This assumption puts an upper bound on the inefficiency of taxation. If we do not impose it, the government's optimal tax rate does not change but the amount of public good provided becomes
which may entail some rationing. the incumbent party receive private rents, to the public good versus the private transfer would depend on the relative expected vote returns from the two types of instruments.
The incumbent would attempt to find the cheapest possible strategy to win the minimum swing votes needed. The paper examines decentralization as a strategic political instrument in this context.
The first critical assumption we make to build the argument is that the vote return from shifting resources at the margin to targeted transfers to some swing voters is greater than the vote return from increasing the public good, at the preferred public good level of the incumbent. That is,
If the incumbent party chooses to seek re-election, it would provide private transfers to swing voters just up to the point where it meets the reelection constraint. The constrained optimal amount of private transfers to swing voters for a government seeking re-election is therefore given by * s f where
The government would attempt to finance the provision of these transfers, by diverting tax revenues collected through its preferred rate provided theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence that low-income or poor voters are more likely to be targeted with vote-buying offers, and more likely to comply (Harding, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Brusco et al, 2004) .
Others have argued for countries like India that since the poor live at or near subsistence levels they are more likely to reward with a vote even a small welfare transfer made directly to their household rather than broad performance in the delivery of public goods (Varshney, 2000; Acharya, 2004) . Their private voting action may therefore be at odds with their publicly declared preferences for public goods, such as when they answer questions about priority problems for the village where they invariably mention village infrastructure (Banerjee et al, 2007) . Bardhan et al (2008) 
Decentralization under local vote mobilization? Now suppose local elections
enable the identification of local leaders with social networks within which vote buying is more effective than through centralized "party machines". This is the second critical assumption for the arguments offered in this paper.
Consider the following form of decentralization-1) announcement of the decentralization of local grants, ))
, determined for each locality at the discretion of the central government for poverty alleviation programs for which the beneficiaries will be identified by locally elected governments; 2) local elections occur to select the candidate who will subsequently determine
; the outcome of the first local elections is determined by a coin toss; 3) the locally elected leader receives n D , and allocates it to nj f to maximize the utility of his/her core supporters subject to a budget and re-election constraint. for those localities where the citizen-candidate who wins elections belongs to the opposition party. 12 To determine grants to the localities where its party affiliates win office, the central incumbent party goes through the following exercise-it first chooses its unconstrained (by re-election) most preferred tax rate and public good level; it then estimates how many swing votes it can get with its preferred level of public goods, and how many more it needs to win reelection. If it has sufficient swing votes at its preferred policy, there is no benefit from decentralization.
If the swing votes are not sufficient, maximize the utility of core constituents subject to a re-election constraint, they will spend the entire grant on buying the swing votes needed for their party to win office both locally and centrally.
14 12 The actions of the state government of Andhra Pradesh in India in the late 1990s have been interpreted in this light-because the elected leaders of village governments were not aligned with the state ruling party, the state party bypassed these local governments and gave program transfers directly to other forms of community organization, user committees, that it was better able to control (Powis, 2003; Manor, 2004) . 13 We assume at this point that the number of localities G n is sufficient to contain the s *  swing voters.
14 The local party leader receives the group-targeted transfers and shares in the general benefits of his/her party holding office.
If local elected leaders are more efficient and effective at identifying and winning the cheapest swing votes than local party operatives, then the local spending needed to win the minimum swing votes would be less than the additional transfers provided by party operatives (in the absence of decentralization):
Decentralization of grants for beneficiary selection of targeted transfers would therefore be selected by the central political incumbent if it were cheaper to buy votes from the poorest voters through the advantages of local-election vote mobilization than through centralized party machines.
Under such political capture of decentralization, it may well be that comparing central versus local targeting performance in the distribution of welfare programs shows that local targeting is more pro-poor; however, the cost of decentralization might lie in the ability of the political party to continue winning office with lower progressive taxation and investment in public goods than would have been possible in the face of the demands of swing voters. This framework therefore suggests a new type of "swing voter's curse" than is available in the literature (Robinson and Torvik, 2009; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996) . The more demanding swing voters become for broad public good, the less likely they are to receive their preferred levels because central politicians would use the means of vote buying in local elections to divide the strength of swing voters, targeting those that can be bought most cheaply, and win elections at lower levels of progressive taxes and public goods (than without well targeted vote buying).
The framework may be extended to allow for heterogeneity in distribution of groups across localities, and to allow for other interest groups to emerge at local levels. 
Evidence on characteristics of local jurisdictions
This section provides evidence from several countries around the world of characteristics of local jurisdictions that is consistent with the implications of a theory of political capture of decentralization explored above. The purpose here is to show that the proposed theory has empirical or practical relevance, rather than to formally test predictions. Table 1 For this paper, detailed reports on local government finances were located for several large countries spread across four major regions of the world. There is clear evidence from three large countries, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria, where responsibility for public service delivery is being increasingly decentralized to local governments, that such decentralized spending is financed by fiscal grants from higher tiers. The average share of own-source revenue in the total revenues managed by local jurisdictions in these three countries is less than or barely equal to 10 percent. This average in fact masks even higher dependence on grants by the majority of local jurisdictions in these countries. In Nigeria, for example, a detailed survey of local government finances in the rural state of Kogi finds that own revenues are only 1-2 percent of total revenues managed by rural 15 Even with such local political differences, decentralization to locally elected governments might be trumped by other strategies of centralized targeting of local precincts of central electoral districts. local governments (Khemani, 2006a) . In another country included in Table 1 , the Philippines, although the average share of own-revenues is 14 percent, the share in the median municipality is 10 percent, and more than a quarter raise less than 5 percent of their total income from local sources.
Municipalities in Peru, the country with the highest share of own revenues among those included in Table 1 , have been characterized by some analysts as having no discretion over local rate setting and tax collection, and effectively being fully financed by central grants (Ahmad and Garcia-Escribano, 2006 American region appear to have a smaller share of municipal spending financed by grants, but even these are higher than in most OECD countries. In Brazil and Mexico grants constitute 67 and 64 percent of municipal revenues (Burki et al, 1999) .
Grants dependence in these countries appears to go hand in hand with small size of local jurisdictions (in terms of population and area), and re-drawing of jurisdiction boundaries or growth in number of jurisdictions over time. Although the average population size of local jurisdictions is higher in Latin America than in Europe, this average appears to be masking large disparities across jurisdictions. Burki et al (1999) find that the vast majority of municipalities in the region have fewer than 15,000 residents. Burki et al (1999) also report shrinking in jurisdiction size, with the number of municipios in Brazil increasing from 3000 to nearly 5000 in the fifteen years following the return to democracy in the country. In Venezuela, they report the number of 18 Burki et al (1999) have also observed that demand for the creation of new jurisdictions is driven by the system of intergovernmental grants in many countries.
Local requests for new jurisdictions typically have to be passed by the national or provincial legislatures, and the theory of political capture of decentralization is consistent with higher tier authorities granting these requests to facilitate vote buying.
Although in many of the countries discussed thus far, a large chunk of grants distribution across local jurisdictions is determined by criteria set out in national constitutions, or a legal decree governing decentralization, there is evidence of significant political manipulation in targeting grants on the basis of local electoral characteristics.
Reviews of international evidence are provided in Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) and Khemani (2006b) . Another striking feature in several countries is the provision of specific spending programs to local jurisdictions by higher-tier politicians, separate from and outside of the regular channels of intergovernmental grants. India, the Philippines, development funds" (CDFs) which allow individual national or state legislators to provide funds for local public infrastructure investment.
Most, if not all, of the literature on inter-governmental fiscal and political relations in the Philippines emphasizes the importance of congressional, gubernatorial, and even presidential pork-barrel projects for city and municipal politics. De Dios (2007) and Rocamora (2008) argue that one of the two main pillars of local political contests in the Philippines is the generation of funds and projects from higher tier governments. 19 In on-going field work in the Philippines, in every municipality visited, respondents describe the importance of political affiliation of local mayors to provincial governors and national congressman in attracting spending programs to their jurisdiction (Khemani and Matsuda, 2008) .
In India, resources are transferred to local governments largely in the form of "schemes" for poverty alleviation, and the primary decentralized local responsibility is that of identifying beneficiaries. Such decentralization has been viewed in the literature as good policy design, in the face of solid evidence of informational advantages of local governments in appropriately identifying the poor or those that have faced particularly negative economic shocks (Alderman, 2002) . However, the arguments in this paper imply that such schemes-based decentralization might lead to clientelist local politics.
Analysis of perverse political incentives at local levels in India has focused overwhelmingly on the risk of "capture" of public resources by local elite for their own benefit, systematically excluding poor and disadvantaged people (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, 2002; Baland and Platteau, 1999) . The alternate hypothesis posited here is that even if such specified "elite capture" is not salient, and poor and disadvantaged groups are politically mobilized, their incentives are to demand short-term private benefits from local governments charged with beneficiary selection for poverty alleviation schemes.
The existence of historical institutions of social inequality in India makes it a setting from which much evidence has been garnered on relative "capture" by local governments. We review this evidence below to argue that it is equally consistent with political mobilization of disadvantaged groups to demand private goods targeted to members of their "group", at the expense of broad public goods from which all group members would benefit. However, this evidence is equally consistent with the arguments in this paper that schemes-based or grants-financed local governments would emphasize the delivery of targeted private benefits to citizens. Bardhan et al (2008) contribute recent evidence from the state of West Bengal in India that voters cite short-term private benefits received from their local governments as most important for their voting decision and support of incumbents, as opposed to longer-term policy initiatives taken by incumbents to promote general public goods. They also find little evidence of political marginalization or political exclusion of weaker socio-economic groups.
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Some evidence on incentives of politicians representing disadvantaged groups to exert effort on public service delivery to their constituents is provided by Keefer and Khemani (2009) gains from public spending. They focus on 3 categories of public goods which together account for 73 percent of the activities of village governments in their sample in Indiaroads, irrigation, and schools. They find that villages with democratically elected governments are more likely to provide more of all three public goods, but the largest effect is for irrigation, as calculated at the sample average, which is the service most likely to benefit the rural elite. However, in villages with a very high proportion of landless (much above the sample average) public investment shifts from irrigation to road construction (rather than education, which is unaffected by proportion landless), which suggests that capture by elites can be ameliorated when the numerical strength of the poor increases, but in a manner that might not be the most efficient for extending benefits to the poor. Roads built by village governments primarily benefit the poor, but largely by 20 The only groups with low participation identified by Bardhan et al (2008) are immigrants, women, and those with low education, not low caste groups or low income/wealth groups.
raising their (short-term) wages, as local road construction and improvement initiatives in India serve as employment programs for the landless poor. Education, which one expects to have the most profound effect on poverty over the medium and long-term, seems least affected by decentralization.
New evidence from India specifically on decentralization of education services further illustrates this point (Banerjee et al, 2007) . A central plank of public policy for improving primary education services in India is the participation of Village Education
Committees ( teacher of the village public school, the key members of the VEC, from whom the village community is urged to ask and receive basic information about local agencies in primary education. The issue raised most frequently in the village meetings, and about which people were most animated, was a government scholarship program intended to provide cash assistance to students from SC/ST groups. SC/ST parents complained that they were not getting these scholarships, whilst teachers complained that parents inappropriately enroll under-age children, that can't and don't attend school, just to lay claim to the scholarships. The second issue that attracted attention was a new government mid-day meal program. Actual learning levels attracted the least attention, and the facilitators had a difficult time steering the conversation away from scholarships and school meals to the broader issue of learning.
Follow-up surveys were undertaken in the same 280 villages in March 2006, 3-6 months after the information campaigns were implemented, and the most surprising fact emerging is that the campaigns did not lead to any substantial improvement in citizens' lack of knowledge of VECs. Less than 10 percent of citizens are aware of the VECs both before and after the interventions. We also find no effect on public school performance.
This contrasts with a dramatic increase in private efforts to improve learning of lagging children in response to information provided-local youth volunteered to hold additional classes outside school, parents of illiterate children in particular chose to participate in these classes, and consequently the children made great strides towards literacy.
However, we don't even have anecdotal evidence that these local volunteers were assisted in their efforts by local government structures-neither the village government head, nor the village public school teacher, nor any member of the VEC. Indeed, according to anecdotes provided by Pratham's facilitators in the field, the public school teacher and the Pradhan in some villages felt threatened by the volunteer activities and attention drawn to learning failures in public schools.
Implications for international development assistance
Much of the reforms being pursued by donors in support of decentralization consist of providing greater revenues or transfers, and building capacity of local governments through training programs such as in public financial management. The arguments here suggest that these reforms on their own might not be efficient or effective in delivering improved public services for actual development outcomes, if the local jurisdictions being supported are politically captured. Greater funds devolved to local governments are more likely to go towards clientelist transfers rather than improvement of public goods. Capacity building can be a waste when local politicians have no incentives to develop technocratic skills for better service delivery.
One of the governance strategies being pursued in international development assistance to improve the impact of decentralization is termed community-driven development (CDD) in which communities are mobilized to identify their preferred projects and to participate in their implementation. The hypothesized governance impact of this strategy is greater social cohesion, and enhanced ability of citizens to demand and receive better public goods performance from their governments. Another is conditional cash transfers (CCT) where households are mandated to access public health and/or education services in order to receive cash transfers. The governance impact of this strategy is hypothesized to be an increase in citizen demand for public health and education services which in turn strengthens political incentives to improve the quality of these broad public goods. Although there are several evaluations planned, underway, or completed, on the impact of CDD and CCT programs on their directly targeted outcomes, such as project quality and beneficiary household-level welfare outcomes, none are designed sufficiently rigorously to assess their impact on local public goods or local political incentives (to the best of the author's knowledge). 21 This is a serious gap in the policy research literature that should be addressed.
Another governance intervention which has not been widely experimented with, that may be used in concert with CDD and CCT interventions or alone, is to promote yardstick competition on service delivery performance by regularly and systematically providing independent, credible, and objective information to citizens and public officials about relative performance across jurisdictions. Part of the problem of clientelist local politics might be lack of independent data and expert analysis available to civil society to judge relative performance across local jurisdictions. New empirical methodologies can be used to fill this gap by measuring service delivery outcomes that are representative at the level of local jurisdictions in feasible and cost effective ways. Once measured, the outcomes can be compiled as "municipal report cards" and disseminated to attempt to promote yardstick competition over performance improvements.
21 Labonne and Chase (2008) make an attempt to assess impact of a CDD project on local governance in the Philippines, but do not appear to have useful governance outcome variables. The variable on which they do find impact-number of village meetings organized by local officials, and household participation in these meetings-is a requirement for a village to access the CDD project, and hence automatically expected to be higher in CDD villages because of the nature of program implementation.
Brazil provides some examples of successful experiences with this type of governance intervention. Tendler (1997) program based on the random auditing of municipal government expenditures by an independent public agency, and then publicly releasing audit findings on the internet and to media sources. 22 New evidence from more than 600 municipalities covered by the audit suggests that the disclosure of information significantly and substantially reduced the re-election rates of mayors who were found to be corrupt (Ferraz and Finan, 2006) .
Furthermore, this impact was significantly more pronounced in municipalities with greater access to radio stations.
More generally, there is a role for greater measurement and monitoring of citizen expectations and demands from government, what policy issues they choose to organize for, to identify new ways in which collective action can be nudged towards broad public goods. More work is needed to identify innovative institutional design or conditions under which political capture is reduced and accountability for local public goods increases.
Conclusion
This paper has examined a theory of decentralization as a political choice of national or provincial leaders to combat growing demands of swing voters for broad public goods, and to continue targeting private benefits to organized interest groups.
Decentralization to new local jurisdictions may be subject to political capture, enabling politicians to buy votes from some swing voters while continuing to provide targeted benefits to their core constituents and to under-provide broad public goods. Local governments in the political capture model are financed entirely by grants, and spend it on targeted transfers to poor voters in exchange for their vote, at the expense of local public goods.
The paper provides examples from several large countries of the developing world of decentralization to small local jurisdictions, financed almost entirely by grants or spending programs received from higher tiers of government, as evidence of the empirical relevance of its theory. It also reviews evidence of the importance of clientelism in local politics, in these same countries where grants finance small local jurisdictions, which further supports the conclusions derived under a theory of political capture of decentralization.
The aim of this analysis is to strike a note of caution for well-intentioned reformers who are attempting to implement participatory local government in political economy contexts that are inimical to organization of citizens for the broad public interest. By bringing to the fore the tension between citizen mobilization for private or group-targeted benefits versus the greater public interest, this work suggests the value of experimenting with other types of complementary governance interventions designed to overcome political constraints to broad public goods.
